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In the quarter century since its passage, the Civil Rights Act of
1964 has left unmistakable evidence of the power of law to change
deeply entrenched patterns of discrimination. In the early years the
Supreme Court interpreted the statute expansively, lest Title VII of
the Act fail in its difficult mission of ensuring equal employment op-
portunity for all American workers. Recently, though, the jurispru-
dential climate that fostered the growth of Title VII has changed.
This change culminated in a spate of decisions last summer in which
the Supreme Court turned on Tide VII and the Civil Rights Act of
1866.'
The most devastating blow came in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, which required plaintiffs to bear the burden of persuasion
throughout disparate impact employment discrimination suits.2 Un-
derstandably, civil rights groups have made overturning Wards Cove
a central goal of recent legislative efforts to amend Title VII. The
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Chairman and Commis-
sioner, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1977-1981.
1. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
2. 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126-27 (1989).
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Civil Rights Act of 1990 imposes proof burdens more favorable to
disparate impact plaintiffs. 3 In the likely event Congress restores
what the Supreme Court took away last year, civil rights advocates
will have scored an impressive victory. I shall argue here, however,
that the Civil Rights Act of 1990 will leave an equally important task
undone: adjusting Title VII to ensure that it protects workers in
America's new service and information-based economy. Although
the burdens placed on Title VII by changes in the American econ-
omy are less obvious than the results of recent judicial retrench-
ment, they represent a challenge of equal magnitude.
L
The primary vehicle of equality for most Americans has not been
statutory law, but an expanding economy. The fundamental as-
sumption of discrimination law is that minorities and women will be
able to compete fairly in the workplace if the law bars invidious dis-
crimination. Excluded groups would then be in a position like that
of other Americans for whom economic forces have tended to erase
discrimination. Based on this experience, American lawmakers have
assumed that economic opportunity is the most effective weapon
against discrimination. In its assault on private discrimination in
American society, Congress addressed employment discrimination
first.
4
The landmark Title VII cases arose in heavy manufacturing and
other smokestack industries. Employers in these settings tradition-
ally hired white working-class males and did not generally need
workers with specific skills or advanced education.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,5 decided in 1971, is the classic case from
this old economy, what I shall call the Griggs Economy. In Griggs,
black workers challenged the use of standardized tests in screening
applicants. The holding in Griggs stands at the center of modem
discrimination law: tests and other quantifiable, "objective" job
3. H.R. 4000 and S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 136. See CONG. REC. S 1018 (daily
ed., Feb. 7, 1990). Section 4 of the proposed Act would overrule the proof burdens set
out by the Court in Wards Cove.
4. Title VII was the first major statute to prohibit discrimination by private parties
and was considered the centerpiece of the Civil Rights Act on its passage in 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to
2000e- 17 (1982)). Only later did Congress prohibit discrimination in electoral adminis-
tration (Voting Rights Act, P.L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (Aug. 6, 1965), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973dd et seq. (1982)) and housing (Fair Housing Act, P.L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (April
11, 1968), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1982)).
5. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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qualifications that disproportionately exclude minorities and women
are subject to heightened scrutiny and require special justification.
6
Today, however, Griggs workplaces are giving way to an economy
driven by services, information, and high technology. Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank and Trust,7 decided in 1987, epitomizes this shift. The
Court there applied the Griggs disparate impact model to supervisor
evaluations and experience requirements of bank tellers, subjective
job criteria typical of service industries. 8 But Watson offered false
hope that statutory interpretation would enable Title VII to work in
the new economy as it had in the Griggs Economy. As the Court's
decisions last year made painfully clear, Watson was the precursor of
a judicial retreat that has rendered Griggs ineffective even in the old
workplace from which it came.
Title VII doctrine, like all legal doctrine, bears the imprint of the
woHd from which it emerged. Congress and the courts fashioned
Title VII for the Griggs Economy, the industrial economy of post-
war America, which proved critical to the statute's successes in bat-
tling employment discrimination. The Griggs Economy demanded
the skills of a workforce that had historically been excluded from the
workplace-black men qualified to do manufacturing work. As the
case law reveals, the black male industrial worker became the para-
digm for the disparate impact plaintifl. This was no accident. Black
men represented a large group barred by racial prejudice from jobs
for which they were manifestly qualified. Thesejobs, in mining, pa-
per, steel, and heavy manufacturing, were typical of the Griggs
Economy and ideal for disparate impact analysis. They required
workers with little formal education and few specific skills. Workers
could quickly acquire the necessary skills on thejob. Thejobs were
often in unionized industries that offered high wages. Despite cen-
turies of discrimination in employment and education, most Blacks
were qualified for these jobs. Naturally, the disproportionate exclu-
sion of Blacks from the workplace supported an inference that em-
ployers had discriminated unlawfully. Moreover, employers had
difficulty justifying such exclusionary practices as a business neces-
sity for jobs that had few prerequisites.
During the 1970s, however, the Griggs Economy stagnated. Eco-
nomic growth rates declined dramatically. The U.S. was hit with
6. Id at 429-36.
7. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
8. Id at 2786-87.
9. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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several recessions. Smokestack industries failed to compete effec-
tively with foreign competition. Numerous plants closed, which left
many manufacturing workers permanently unemployed. At the
same time, service sector employment burgeoned. Demand in-
creased for highly paid workers in the financial services and elec-
tronics industries. Low-wage jobs in the service sector also
proliferated. These jobs demanded subjective qualifications that
were more likely to exclude minority and women employees. To-
day, it is clear that the Griggs Economy workplace, where Title VII
had done its best work, will not offer the best source of economic
opportunity for minorities and women in the future.
II.
Despite these economic changes, Title VII doctrine remains tied
to the Griggs Economy. Service and technological jobs were, of
course, plentiful during the 1960s and 1970s. However, the Title
VII case law of the 1970s developed in the manufacturing sector,
where an insufficient representation of a group of qualified workers
easily suggested racial discrimination. Even as the Griggs Economy
declined, employment discrimination doctrine continued to develop
in an industrial setting. One reason was that the extraordinary
amount of time necessary to prepare and conduct complicated Title
VII litigation. Because of the difficulties of discovery and proof in
employment discrimination cases, Title VII suits rival antitrust liti-
gation in their prodigious length. Consequently, the 1970s saw a
steady stream of Griggs Economy cases that arose from employment
practices of the 1960s.10 Similarly, there was a corresponding lag in
litigation from the expanding service industries. Only in the past
few years have cases from the new economy tested the premises em-
bodied in Griggs.
It is not surprising then that Watson, the first disparate impact case
challenging subjective job qualifications, did not reach the Supreme
Court until 1987. Suits involving subjective qualifications more
often lent themselves to disparate treatment analysis. Service sector
employers most likely to use subjective criteria-such as the bank in
Watson-tend to organize workers in smaller units. The duties of
employees in these industries frequently vary from job to job. In
10. For example, plaintiffs in Albemarle Paper filed their discrimination suit in 1966,
nine years before the Supreme Court decided their case. 422 U.S. at 408.
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addition, the number of workers subject to the same hiring and pro-
motion standards is often too small to sustain a class action, the pre-
dominant form of disparate impact litigation. Plaintiffs from the
service sector naturally preferred familiar disparate treatment analy-
sis to the uncharted territory of disparate impact and subjective job
criteria.
Moreover, subjective job qualifications intuitively lead courts and
litigants to look for discriminatory intent. For example, if a black
car rental agent challenges an unfavorable evaluation of her cus-
tomer relation skills, the plaintiff is more likely to allege conscious,
deliberate discrimination on the part of the employer than if she had
been denied a construction job on the basis of a standardized test.
Similarly, the defendant in such a case will likely have greater suc-
cess in casting the dispute as a mere personality clash between
worker and boss in which neither race nor sex played any part. Such
a case will hinge on discrimination in particular employment relation-
ships rather than on the possibility that the subjective performance
criteria, although facially neutral, unfairly burden minorities and
women generally. Given disparate impact's inadequacy in the new
economy, it is not surprising that suits challenging subjective crite-
ria often take an alternative course.
III.
Before the mid-1980s, lawyers and scholars did not appreciate
that the disparate impact model would inevitably extend to the sub-
jective employment standards of the service economy. Watson made
the extension, but in so doing crippled disparate impact theory as
applied both to objective and subjective criteria. The plaintiff in
Watson initially brought her suit under a claim of disparate treat-
ment, not disparate impact. The setting was a bank, the paradig-
matic workplace of the new economy. Bank employees require
cognitive skills and the ability to work with the public. Subjective
criteria may be the only way an employer can assess such qualities.
Clara Watson, a black woman, had been hired as a teller and pro-
moted to "commercial teller." She then failed in four separate at-
tempts to obtain supervisory positions. In each case, the supervisor
who denied Watson the promotion and the worker who got the pro-
motion were white. I" The bank's promotion criteria were typical of
11. Watson, 487 U.S. at 982.
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new economy jobs: prior experience as a teller and supervisor, col-
legiality, and excellent performance ratings. Where supervisors
have the best knowledge of their own staff, evaluations made on the
basis of these criteria often appear credible. Consequently, the
bank succeeded in establishing legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reasons for its promotion decisions, thus defeating Watson's dispa-
rate treatment claim. Watson then invoked a disparate impact the-
ory. Under the bank's rating procedure, supervisors had full
discretion to make subjective evaluations, but were given no gui-
dance about the content of relevant criteria. These open-ended,
subjective evaluations and the disproportionately low number of
Blacks in supervisory positions together suggested that promotion
decisions were discriminatory.
The Court applied disparate impact analysis to Watson's claim,
but it exacted a heavy price in return. The plurality lifted the bur-
den of proving a business necessity from defendants, leaving plain-
tiffs to prove that employment criteria are not job-related. At the
same time, the plurality lowered the business, necessity standard,
making it more difficult for plaintiffs to bear the burden they just
assumed. 12 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, a five-justice majority
ratified the new burden of proof and the more lenient business ne-
cessity defense set out in Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in
Watson. 1
3
The ultimate effect of Watson on Title VII should be a lesson to
the supporters of effective employment discrimination law. At the
time Watson was decided, litigants and scholars concentrated almost
exclusively on whether Griggs would apply to subjective criteria.
Supporters of equal opportunity urged that the extension of dispa-
rate impact analysis in Watson was necessary for the survival of Title
VII. Unfortunately, this urgency obscured the fact that lawyers and
scholars had not answered the most critical question: not whether dis-
parate impact should apply, but how will it apply in the new econ-
omy? The assumption that the Court could simply superimpose
Griggs on subjective criteria proved dangerously optimistic.
IV
Whether disparate impact can make the transition from the
Griggs Economy to the new economy ultimately depends on the
definition of the business necessity standard. The Court in Griggs
12. Id. at 998-99.
13. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2123-26.
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deliberately set a high standard in order to counter the exclusionary
"headwinds" of selection criteria unrelated to the relevant job.14
Under Griggs, employers were forced to justify orjettison job qualifi-
cations that had a demonstrated disparate impact on minorities and
women. This exacting business necessity standard led employers to
reform their recruitment and selection methods. Job openings,
which had formerly gone to insiders (who tend to come from groups
already employed), were now posted openly. New standardized
tests, more likely to measure relevant skills, were adopted. Over the
past two decades, the business necessity standard has removed
many discriminatory obstacles from the workplace.
Now, in the workplace of the new economy, we must devise a new
business necessity standard. Jobs in banks and insurance compa-
nies, for example, often require skills (like the ability to deal with
clients) that can be measured only subjectively. Case law is remark-
ably free of attempts to articulate how disparate impact might ap-
ply.' 5 In the absence of readily available alternatives to supervisor
evaluations and similar techniques, courts have been reluctant to
overrule the employer's judgment. 16 Worse, some courts have indi-
cated that disparate impact theory is inappropriate for subjective
qualifications.' 7 Techniques for validating subjective qualifications
are not yet as sophisticated or convincing as those used to test ob-
jective employment criteria. Lawyers must fill this methodological
and doctrinal gap.
Sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 have taken the first steps
in revitalizing the business necessity standard, but the standard
faces the same difficulty in Congress that it faced in the Court.
Many legislators fiercely oppose the stringent "essential to effective
job performance" standard contained in the pending Civil Rights
Act. ' 8 These opponents fear that such a high hurdle will force em-
ployers who cannot justify their selection criteria to adopt quotas in
order to fend off lawsuits. 19 Some proponents of disparate impact
14. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
15. Before Vatson, a marginal discussion in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975), was the only Supreme Court treatment of the issue. The Court there noted
the flaw in supervisor evaluations that lacked established criteria for assessing job per-
formance. 422 U.S. at 432-33.
16. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 999.
17. See, e.g., Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
18. H.R. 4000, S. 2104, § 4.
19. In Mards Cove, the Court invoked the same fear as a justification for making the
business necessity standard more lenient. See, e.g., Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2122 (ob-
serving that a high standard may make quotas the only "practicable option" for employ-
ers faced with disparate impact suits).
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encourage a high standard for just that reason. 20 Because "quota" is
an even dirtier word than "liberal" in contemporary American poli-
tics, advocates of the current legislation deny that the proposed
business necessity standard will encourage quotas. 2' Compromise
on the business necessity standard, however, may prove inevitable.
Unfortunately, the difficulties posed by application of disparate
impact analysis to subjective qualifications are serious and complex.
They will not succumb to the most obvious legislative solutions
alone. We must overcome the complexity of these issues and make
disparate impact theory work in the new economy. The rapid
growth of the service, information, and high technology industries
assures that subjective job criteria will remain prevalent. More than
objective criteria, subjective standards present opportunities for ra-
cial and sexual stereotyping and other forms of conscious and un-
conscious discrimination. Unless the appropriate doctrinal tools are
developed, the inability of plaintiffs to prove unlawful discrimina-
tion in the new economy may turn these opportunities into
incentives.
We cannot escape the fact that subjective employment decisions
will remain necessary in the new economy. We must, however, re-
spond effectively to economic change by devising new, persuasive
techniques for validating subjective criteria. This work is already
proceeding. Current debate over the business necessity standard
will likely advance it. The Civil Rights Act of 1990, however, cannot
do the job alone. Equally essential is a new theoretical foundation
for the disparate impact model that will allow Title VII to serve
workers in the new economy as it served those in the Griggs
Economy.
20. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945,
1026-27 (1982)(urging the use of quotas on the ground that subjective criteria are im-
possible to validate effectively). For another view of the relationship between quotas
and the business necessity standard, see Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment
Discrimination, and Legislative Intent: The Fallaty of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. LEG. 99,
133-35 (1983)(suggesting a lower business necessity standard where minorities and wo-
men are employed in proportion to their numbers in the workforce).
21. See Testimony of William T. Coleman, Jr. (Chairman, NAACP Legal Defense
Fund) before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Feb. 23, 1990.
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